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We  address  the  issue  of how  visual  information  stored  in  working  memory  (WM)  is  introspected.  In
other  words,  how  do we  become  aware  of WM  content  in order  to consciously  examine  or  manipulate  it?
Inﬂuential models  of  WM  have  suggested  that  WM  representations  are  either  conscious  by deﬁnition,  or
directly accessible  for  conscious  inspection.  We  propose  that  WM  introspection  does  not  operate  on the
actual  memory  trace  but  rather  requires  a  new  representation  to  be created  for the  conscious  domain.
This conscious  representation  exists  in  addition  and  in parallel  to  the actual  memory  representation.orking memory
ntrospection
onsciousness
isual short-term memory
ental imagery
The  existence  of  such  a separate  representation  is revealed  by  and  reﬂected  in  the  qualitatively  different
functional  characteristics  between  the  actual  memory  trace  and  its  conscious  experience,  and  their  dis-
tinct  interactions  within  external  visual  input.  Our model  differs  from  state-based  models  in that  WM
introspection  does  not  involve  a change  in the  state  of WM  content,  but rather  involves  the  creation  of a
new,  second  representation  existing  in parallel  to the  original  memory  trace.
©  2015  The  Authors.  Published  by Elsevier  Ltd.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the  CC  BY-NC-ND
license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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. Introduction
Working memory (WM)  refers to short-term maintenance of
nformation in service of goal-directed behavior (e.g. Baddeley,
992a; Cowan, 1998). In WM,  information is stored in an online
ashion, allowing its contents to be easily accessed by other cogni-
ive processes. In addition to the storage of perceptual input, WM
s also involved in the retrieval of episodic memories from long-
erm memory (Ericsson and Kintsch, 1995). Some of the behavioral
onsequences of WM operations occur automatically, without the
eed for conscious utilization of WM content. For example, WM
an automatically guide attention in a visual search context (Soto
t al., 2005, 2006). Nonetheless, a key feature of WM is that its con-
ent can be consciously accessed, manipulated and examined (i.e.
ntrospected).
Here, we address the question of how such introspection takes
lace. We will focus particularly on WM operations in the visual
omain, i.e. on visual short-term memory (VSTM). While previ-
us research and theoretical discussion has focused on whether
M operations can take place outside of awareness (cf. Hassin
t al., 2009), and whether subliminal visual information can reach
M (Rosenthal et al., 2010; Soto and Silvanto, 2014; Soto et al.,
011), here we focus on how visual information can be consciously
ccessed and experienced, after it has been committed to WM.
n the basis of recent empirical evidence and theoretical consid-
rations, we propose that we do not consciously experience the
ctual memory representation. Rather, in order for memory con-
ent to be phenomenally experienced, a new representation needs
o be created for the conscious domain. This representation, which
xists in addition and parallel to the actual memory representation,
ig. 1. Possibilities of the relationship between WM content and its conscious experien
he  red circle depicts the representations currently in consciousness: (A) WM content i
id  of attention, a memory representation can be consciously experienced. The area of o
xperience is depicted here as part of WM.  One might argue that there can be conscious
M  content, rather than consciousness in general, for reasons of clarity this view is not
irectly consciously experienced. (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁguehavioral Reviews 55 (2015) 510–519 511
forms the basis of the conscious experience of memory content.
The need to create a separate representation for introspection is a
consequence of the distinct functional characteristics and roles of
conscious perception and certain aspects of WM.
2. Conventional views of how WM content reaches
consciousness
One may  argue that in many VSTM tasks, it is not necessary to
bring the memory item into conscious experience at all. Memory
accuracy is often assessed using forced-choice measures, which do
not necessarily require conscious inspection of the memory item.
There is ample evidence that forced-choice tasks can be performed
on visual stimuli which are outside of conscious experience (Lau
and Passingham, 2006; VanRullen and Koch, 2003; Weiskrantz,
1986). This has also been found to be the case for VSTM (Soto
et al., 2011). Furthermore, many behavioral consequences of WM
occur automatically (for example, attentional guidance (Soto et al.,
2005, 2006), and are thus unlikely to require conscious inspection
of memory content. However, a key feature of WM is that its content
can be consciously scrutinized and manipulated (i.e. introspected).
Below we describe and evaluate two inﬂuential viewpoints on the
relationship between WM content and its conscious experience.
2.1. Viewpoint 1: All WM content is by deﬁnition consciousIn the psychological literature, there is a long tradition of
equating WM processes with conscious experience (see Fig. 1a).
The gist of this view, originating in the 19th century, is that
the original memory trace is needed for conscious experience:
ce. The representation of all WM content is reﬂected by the blue circles, whereas
s always conscious. (B) WM content is not automatically conscious, but with the
verlap between the two circles reﬂects the zone of direct access. (Note conscious
 experience outside of WM,  but as the ﬁgure concerns the conscious experience of
 depicted here.) (C) Our proposal that the actual memory representation is never
re legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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Without memory no conscious sensation, without memory no
onsciousness” (Richet, 1886). Almost a century later, Atkinson and
hiffrin (1968) proposed a multi-store model of the memory sys-
em consisting of three components: sensory memory, short-term
tore (STS), and long-term store. The STS resembles the concept of
M in the sense that, apart from passive storage, the information
n STS is also used for active processes, like decision-making and
roblem solving. STS content was proposed to correspond to the
ontents of conscious experience (Atkinson and Shiffrin, 1971).
Subsequently, Baddeley developed a multiple component
odel of WM in which a visuospatial and a verbal slave sys-
em are controlled by a central executive (Baddeley and Hitch,
974). Similar to the Atkinson and Shiffrin model, information
n certain components of the model was assumed to automati-
ally reach awareness. The earlier versions of his model proposed
hat all WM input, output, and voluntary operations are conscious
Baddeley, 1992b). Later models introduced the so-called episodic
uffer, which plays a particularly important role in feature binding
nd awareness (Baddeley, 2000).
Furthermore, the study of subliminal processing has demon-
trated that the human information processing system is selective
s to which elements reach consciousness, and WM has been
onsistently implicated in theories of consciousness as the mech-
nism through which this selection takes place. For example,
n certain versions of Global Workspace Theory (Baars, 1988),
M serves as a global workspace, the contents of which
ecome conscious experiences (Baars and Franklin, 2003; Baars,
002).
.2. Viewpoint 2: WM content remains unconscious until focused
ttention selects the representation for conscious inspection
The gist of this second inﬂuential view is that WM content
s not equal to conscious experience, allowing for the possibil-
ty that, at any given time, there are items in WM that are not
onscious (see Fig. 1b). However, attention can bring the original
emory trace into consciousness. The inﬂuential theory of Cowan
tates that WM can be conceived of as a zone of direct access,
hich can retain an unlimited number of activated representa-
ions in parallel, but only representations in the focus of internal
ttention can be accessed directly (Cowan, 1988). Focused atten-
ion is supposedly capacity-limited, with a maximum of four items
ithin the focus of attention at any given time. According to this
odel, not all WM content is consciously accessible: the corre-
ponding representation needs to be activated and placed within
he focus of internal attention for this to occur. Oberauer (2002)
eveloped this model further by introducing an unlimited store of
eactivated long-term memory representations, a capacity-limited
hort-term store (or zone of direct access), and a process of focused
ttention with a maximal storage capacity of a single item only
Oberauer, 2009, 2002). The key feature shared by both Cowan’s
nd Oberauer’s models is that placing the original memory rep-
esentation in the center of focused attention enables conscious
ccess.
. Evaluating conventional views in the light of recent
vidence
In the following sections, these two models are evaluated in light
f recent studies, which have directly examined the relationship
etween conscious experience and WM..1. Working memory can operate upon unconscious content
In Viewpoint 1, conscious experience is equated with WM con-
ent. Therefore, empirical evidence demonstrating dissociationsehavioral Reviews 55 (2015) 510–519
between WM content and conscious experience would refute this
position. In fact, a number of studies have found such dissociations,
either by using subliminal stimuli or by embedding implicit spa-
tial patterns in supraliminal stimuli (Hassin et al., 2009; Pan et al.,
2013; Rosenthal et al., 2010; Soto et al., 2011). For example, Hassin
et al. (2009) demonstrated that WM processes required for pattern
extraction, such as the keeping track of objects’ sequential spatial
positions, can take place incidentally without participants’ aware-
ness of them. Subsequently, in a series of experiments Soto et al.
(2011) consistently demonstrated above-chance performance on a
delayed discrimination task, even when participants reported no
conscious awareness of the memory cues at encoding. The ﬁnd-
ing that subliminal stimuli can be encoded into and maintained in
VSTM, and that a range of WM operations can take place without
participants’ awareness, contradicts views which equate WM with
consciousness.
3.2. WM contents and their conscious experience can be
dissociated
According to Viewpoint 2, WM content is not always consciously
experienced. However, when it is (via allocation of attention to
the WM representation), the content of the conscious experience
is based on the actual memory trace (Cowan, 1988). Consistent
with the view that the actual memory representation is consciously
accessed, measures of memory performance and conﬁdence gen-
erally tend to correlate quite strongly (Rademaker et al., 2012;
Vandenbroucke et al., 2014), which is intuitive, given that con-
scious access to invalid information would have little behavioral
relevance.
Nevertheless, there is evidence to indicate that metacognition
of higher-level cognitive processes is sometimes inaccurate (see
e.g. Nisbett and Wilson, 1977; Koriat, 2007 for review). Further-
more, a recent study by Scott et al. (2014) showed the reverse
phenomenon: above chance metacognitive performance in the
absence of decision accuracy, which they labeled ‘blind insight’.
Thus metacognition and actual objective task performance do not
always go hand-in-hand and this has been shown to be case also
for WM.
In a recent study by Bona et al. (2013), WM accuracy and con-
scious experience of the memory item (as assessed with vividness
ratings) were found to be differently affected by the presentation of
a distracter during the retention period. Memory accuracy for the
orientation of a Gabor patch was impaired by both visible and invis-
ible distracter stimuli that differed from the original memory cue by
40◦, but not by smaller angle differences. In contrast, memory vivid-
ness was reduced by distracters of all orientations, but only when
they were rendered invisible. This double dissociation suggests that
introspection is a distinct process from the use of memory content
in order to perform a forced-choice behavioral task. The key ﬁnding
was the existence of a condition in which VSTM accuracy was
impaired whilst memory vividness was  unaffected. If introspection
was merely a “conscious window” into the actual memory trace,
then manipulations which affect the integrity of that trace should
always affect its conscious experience. However, this was not the
case.
The ﬁndings described above seem inconsistent with the view
that introspection involves direct and accurate access to the
actual memory trace. Rather, the double dissociation suggests
that memory maintenance and introspection rely on separate
representations. One might argue that dissociations between mem-
ory accuracy and introspection result from the latter requiring
additional attentional processes, rendering it more vulnerable to
distracter interference. However, even if this is the case, it does not
explain the double dissociation found by Bona et al. (2013), and
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peciﬁcally the condition in which the memory trace was  impaired
ut vividness was unaffected, because in all views in which intro-
pection is directly based on the memory trace, anything that
ffects the integrity of the WM trace should also affect its con-
cious experience. In a recent study, memory accuracy and WM
xperience were also dissociated when conﬁdence ratings rather
han memory vividness were used as a measure of VSTM experience
Bona and Silvanto, 2014).
.3. VSTM and its conscious experience interact with external
isual input in a qualitatively different fashion
Consciousness of sensory information generally takes the form
f a phenomenally experienced image, even when the experi-
nce is internally generated from WM or long-term memory. Such
n ‘internal conscious percept’ is referred to as a mental image
Kosslyn, 1994). As mental imagery can be deﬁned as conscious
xperience of memory content, studies on its cognitive and neural
nderpinnings are relevant to the question of how WM content is
henomenally experienced.
Conscious experience of WM content in the form of visual
magery is known to interfere with performance in various con-
urrently performed visual tasks. The Perky effect refers to the
henomenon in which mental imagery hampers the perception
f simultaneously presented visual information (Perky, 1910). For
xample, when participants are asked to form a mental image of
 previously presented feature (the mental imagery thus reﬂect-
ng VSTM content), the mental image impairs the detection of
n external item presented in the same location of visual space,
egardless of their featural similarity. This effect resembles inter-
erence by an external visual mask and is believed to be primarily
ensory in nature, mimicking a reduction in target energy, rather
han merely resulting from attentional effects (Craver-Lemley and
eeves, 1987). Thus the consciously experienced memory content
as an inhibitory relationship with external input at the level of
he visual representation. The functional role of this masking effect
ay  be to suppress visual input in order to prevent the mental
mage from being overwritten (Craver-Lemley and Reeves, 1992).
urthermore, a suppressive effect also occurs in the other direc-
ion. As discussed earlier, Bona et al. (2013) found that unconscious
isual distracters interfered with reported vividness of WM,  even
hen the distracter matched memory content. The key point is
hat internally generated percepts and external visual input have
 mutually inhibitory relationship, likely to reﬂect competition for
ccess to consciousness.
While mental imagery suppresses external input, the impact of
M on the encoding of incoming visual information is more com-
lex. Attention is allocated to stimuli which match VSTM content,
t the cost of stimuli which are incongruent with the items held
n VSTM (e.g. Carlisle and Woodman, 2011; Downing, 2000; Gayet
t al., 2013; Pan and Soto, 2010; Soto et al., 2005). Furthermore,
ccess to consciousness is facilitated for perceptual inputs which
atch VSTM content, whereas consciousness for incongruent input
s inhibited (Pan et al., 2013). Thus, VSTM has an interactive rela-
ionship with external input; it acts as a ‘gatekeeper’, guiding
ttention and conscious access on the basis of current memory
tates. These effects are also sensory in nature, occurring in the
isual cortex where the VSTM storage takes place (Soto et al., 2007).
n addition, while subliminal visual input impairs conscious experi-
nce of WM content even when the two are congruent (Bona et al.,
013), it has no such effect on VSTM accuracy; if anything, there is slight facilitation of WM performance (Silvanto and Soto, 2012).
his dissociation indicates that conscious experience of WM and
he actual memory content are based on representations with very
ifferent functional characteristics.ehavioral Reviews 55 (2015) 510–519 513
4. Emerging view: WM storage and introspection of WM
content are based on distinct representations
The behavioral evidence reviewed above challenges the view
that WM content and its conscious experience are intrinsically
coupled. First, demonstrations of unconscious WM functions are
inconsistent with the view that WM content needs to be inherently
conscious (Hassin et al., 2009; Soto et al., 2011). Second, the double
dissociation between WM content and its conscious experience is
inconsistent with the view that the latter is directly based on the
actual memory representation (Bona and Silvanto, 2014; Bona et al.,
2013). Third, consciously experienced memory content has a dif-
ferent impact on external visual input than WM content not being
introspected (Craver-Lemley and Reeves, 1992; Pan et al., 2013;
Perky, 1910), indicating that the consciously experienced represen-
tation has different functional characteristics than the WM trace on
which it is based.
To account for these ﬁndings, we  propose a novel view accord-
ing to which WM representations are intrinsically unconscious,
and introspecting them requires the creation of a new representa-
tion into the conscious domain (see Fig. 1c). This “conscious copy”
has different functional properties from the underlying WM rep-
resentation, which gives rise to the dissociations described above.
Contrary to the positions depicted in Fig. 1a and b, the actual mem-
ory trace is never consciously experienced, and thus cannot be
the subject of introspection. Wilful manipulation of the conscious
copy can however feed back to the original memory trace, allowing
memory contents to be updated and modulated.
Prior models have suggested mental imagery and VSTM to be
distinct in the sense that they are different cognitive operations.
However, in these models, both processes act on a single rep-
resentation and rely on the same memory store (Baddeley and
Logie, 1999; Logie, 2011, 2003, 1995). In our view, read-out dur-
ing introspection involves the creation of a new representation
which exists independently and in parallel to the actual memory
trace (see Fig. 2a). Moreover, a key feature of the conscious copy is
that, even though it reﬂects memory content, its functional proper-
ties are more similar to those of other types of conscious percepts
(whether internally generated or externally induced) than to those
of memory representations.
5. The need for separation: Distinct functions and
characteristics of WM and conscious perception
We propose that the need for a separate representation for intro-
spection of WM content is a consequence of the distinct functional
characteristics and roles of conscious perception and certain func-
tions of WM.  After external input has been analyzed by the visual
system, WM maintains relevant information and keeps it readily
available for cognitive systems for guiding behavior. One important
function of WM is to allocate attention to and bias the processing of
incoming visual information. For example, as was discussed above,
WM facilitates access to consciousness for matching perceptual
inputs (Pan et al., 2013) and allocates attention to matching exter-
nal stimuli (Soto et al., 2006). WM thus acts as a “gatekeeper” of
visual perception (see Fig. 2b).
In contrast, during conscious experience (whether internally
generated or externally induced), the interaction between different
sources of visual information serves a different function. A critical
aspect of conscious perception is that the source of the percept
needs to be ascertained; confusion of internal and external sources
of information results in the experience of hallucinations, as is the
case in psychosis (Frith and Done, 1988). Therefore, when any kind
of visual information is consciously perceived, contamination from
other sources needs to be avoided. In the case of WM introspection,
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Fig. 2. “Conscious copy” model of WM introspection. The main gist of this model is that the conscious experience of WM content is not based on the actual memory
representation. Rather, a new representation is created for the conscious domain (A). VSTM content and the conscious representation of that content interact differentially
with  external input. Conscious experience of VSTM content suppresses the encoding of concurrent visual information (dashed lines), whether matching or not (i.e. Perky
effect).  In contrast, WM content can facilitate the encoding and awareness of matching visual input (solid lines) (B). According to the model we present here, information
passes through the following stages in a standard WM task (C): (1) The external, to-be-remembered stimulus is consciously experienced. There is some evidence that
suggests  that unconscious features of external input may  reach consciousness (Soto and Silvanto, 2014), however in most circumstances information will ﬁrst be consciously
experiences before it enters into WM store. (2) The item is then transmitted to the WM store, at which point it is no longer conscious. Thus, it passes from phenomenal
awareness to an unconscious form, which is consistent with Cowan’s model (1988, 1998) according to which not all WM content is consciously accessible. (3) If introspection
is  required, a conscious copy of the original WM content is created for this purpose. Any manipulations carried out on the conscious copy can then be stored in unconscious
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emory representation can take place (e.g. in forced-choice tasks).
here the conscious experience is internally generated, intrusion
f external input needs to be prevented. To accomplish this, incom-
ng visual information is suppressed whenever an internal percept
s experienced (see Fig. 2b). Conversely, when the aim is to con-
ciously perceive the external world, internally generated percepts
ust be inhibited from reaching awareness. Thus the “conscious
opy” is a representation competing for conscious access, rather
han a representation guiding visual processing at the early levels
f processing.trospection is not required, retrieval without introspection based on the original
The proposed idea of a ‘conscious copy’ of a WM representation
is somewhat analogous to what in the science of motor behavior is
known as the efference copy; a copy of an original motor program is
created and fed back to the system as a means to predict the sensory
consequences of the programed, to–be-executed action (Cullen,
2004). This allows the observer to distinguish between incom-
ing sensory information as a consequence of voluntary behavior,
and sensory information from external sources. The purpose of the
copied WM content might be similar, in the sense that it allows the
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ystem to distinguish between content within the memory systems
hat is externally generated, such as visual sensory input, and inter-
ally generated content, such as mental imagery. In fact, defective
unctioning of efference copies has been suggested to play a role
n psychosis and schizophrenia (Brebion et al., 2008; Simons et al.,
006).
. WM:  Conscious or unconscious?
Of course, not all WM processes occur unconsciously. When we
ctively rehearse information in order to facilitate retention, we are
erforming this action with full awareness. Indeed, consciousness
ay  be important for working memory for the same reasons that
ensory input may  beneﬁt from conscious experience. Issues such
s ﬂexibility, integration of information, and dealing with input of
reat complexity have been put forward to explain the need for con-
ciousness (see Seth, 2009 for review), and they may  apply to WM
s well. Furthermore, since much of the research described here has
een performed with simple visual stimuli, we cannot exclude that
lthough awareness might not be a prerequisite for speciﬁc WM
perations on these stimuli, consciousness is necessary when the
timuli and the associated WM processes are more complex. How-
ver, multiple higher-level cognitive functions (i.e. visual search,
ord recognition, reading, and arithmetic) that rely on WM func-
ions such as its executive component (e.g. Fürst and Hitch, 2000)
ave been shown to operate successfully in the absence of con-
ciousness (Maljkovic and Martini, 2005; McKone, 1995; Sklar et al.,
012). More research on higher-level WM processes is required to
ully establish the extent of implicit WM for higher-level cognitive
perations, but the above studies provide the ﬁrst promising results
o indicate that conscious experience is not always a prerequisite,
ot even for semantic processes.
It is important to point out however that even when WM oper-
tions are conscious, this does not imply that that they require
onscious access to WM content, and vice versa. For example, suc-
essful extraction of patterns from visual stimuli and their encoding
nto WM appears to require conscious experience of the mem-
ry cue (Hsieh and Colas, 2012), but no conscious experience of
ngaging into pattern extraction and maintenance (Hassin et al.,
009). Furthermore, subliminally presented orientation informa-
ion can be encoded into WM when participants are knowingly
ngaged in WM encoding and maintenance (Soto et al., 2011). WM
nvolves various components, some of which might be conscious
n any given situation while others are unconscious. In this con-
ext, a key distinction needs to be made between awareness of
M operations (cf. Hassin et al., 2009), awareness of stimuli to
e encoded (Soto et al., 2011), and awareness of the actual memory
ontent once it has been encoded into WM.  Previous research has
hown that the ﬁrst two of these can occur unconsciously. Here we
ocus on the latter issue and propose that the actual WM content
s never consciously experienced, and that its conscious inspec-
ion requires the creation of a new representation in the conscious
omain.
. Feature-bound introspection versus feature-speciﬁc WM
The dissociation between WM content and its conscious expe-
ience entails that the conscious copy is in some respects different
rom the original memory trace, and that the copying process is,
n that sense, imperfect. This may  partly result from introspection
nvolving bound percepts whereas WM can operate at the level of
eatures. A clue to this issue is offered by the study of Bona et al.
2013), in which subjective vividness of WM content suffered from
ny type of (unconscious) visual distracter, whereas WM accuracy
as impaired only when its orientation was sufﬁciently differentehavioral Reviews 55 (2015) 510–519 515
from the memory item. The lack of sensitivity to individual stim-
ulus features speaks in favor of viewing the conscious copy as a
feature-bound percept. In fact, it seems impossible to imagine any
single feature (for example, the orientation of a line) fully inde-
pendently of other features, such as luminance or contrast, which
provide surface properties to the percept. Our  conscious experi-
ence, whether internally generated or externally induced, always
consists of whole objects or scenes, rather than of individual fea-
tures. In contrast, WM maintenance can be feature-speciﬁc and
can rely on orientation and spatial frequency channels in the early
visual cortex (e.g. Magnussen et al., 1991). Of  course, WM can also
store conjunctions of features and whole objects. Nevertheless, the
point is that, unlike the conscious copy, it can operate at the level
of individual features.
A possibility arising from this is that introspection does not
require the creation of a new copy for conscious inspection, but
rather, involves accessing an object-level representation which
may  not incorporate all aspects of feature-level memory traces.
In this view, the key issue is not whether a representation is
consciously accessed, but rather its featural complexity. How-
ever this view cannot account for all the evidence discussed here.
For example, facilitation of visual processing by working mem-
ory (as discussed in Section 5) is also found when WM content
involves representations at object-level. In the study by Soto et al.
(2005), WM maintenance of a colored circle facilitated the detec-
tion of matching objects and impaired the detection of incongruent
objects. In contrast, conscious experience (in the form of imagery)
of objects held in WM always inhibits concurrent visual input,
regardless of congruency (cf. Perky effect discussed in Section 3.3).
Thus, it appears to be the extent of conscious experience rather
than the complexity of the memory representation that explains
the functional differences.
8. A new perspective on the link between VSTM,  imagery
and visual awareness: Summary of the “conscious copy”
model (see Fig. 2c)
Below we summarize the main features of the proposed ‘con-
scious copy’ model on WM introspection. Some of its aspects are
based on recent empirical evidence, others on theoretical consider-
ations. We  acknowledge that some components require empirical
testing and that certain aspects may  be considered speculative.
However, its main gist, namely that WM content during the mainte-
nance period in WM tasks is fundamentally unconscious, and that
its introspection requires the creation of a conscious copy of the
WM content, is supported by empirical evidence.
The model has the following tenets:
1. The content of WM during maintenance is unconscious.
For WM content to be introspected, a new representation
must be created for the conscious domain. Without enter-
ing the conscious domain, WM can act in an automatic fashion
to guide behavior (e.g. by directing attention). The “conscious
copy” enables phenomenal awareness of memory content and
is required for willful inspection and manipulation of memory
content.
2. The WM trace and the conscious copy are independent repre-
sentations, such that they can be differentially inﬂuenced and
modulated (e.g. by distracting information). Once the conscious
copy has been created, disruption to the original memory trace
does not compromise introspection. The outcome of any con-
scious manipulation can feed back to and modulate the original
memory trace. Separate representations are needed due to the
different functional demands of conscious perception and WM
guidance of visual processing.
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. The WM representation and the conscious copy interact dif-
ferently with incoming visual information. WM acts as a
gatekeeper, guiding the encoding of incoming sensory informa-
tion. It can either enhance or suppress the detection of external
signals, depending on congruency and current goals. In contrast,
the conscious representation has a mutually suppressive rela-
tionship with external sensory input, which is required to be
able to adequately distinguish internal and external percepts.
. WM can be feature-speciﬁc; the conscious representation
involves a bound object. We  cannot consciously experience
an individual feature in isolation of other features. Thus, the
conscious copy is by deﬁnition of feature-bound objects or con-
junctions, perhaps based on the episodic memory of having
perceived the stimulus at the beginning of the trial.
. Neural underpinning of the “conscious copy”: Different
ognitive representations imply different neural
epresentations
Separate mental representations need to be supported by dis-
inct neural representations. The behavioral studies discussed
bove have identiﬁed quantiﬁable aspects consistent with cur-
ent neuroscientiﬁc knowledge that can help to link our cognitive
odel to neurophysiology. For example, the impact of visual input
n WM depends on featural similarity (e.g. cue-distracter orien-
ation difference), consistent with low-level orientation channels
eing involved (see also Magnussen et al., 1991). In contrast, con-
cious experience WM content is impaired by all distracting visual
nput, independently of its featural similarity with memory con-
ent (Bona et al., 2013). This shows that VSTM maintenance can
ngage feature-speciﬁc mechanisms (such as orientation channels
n early visual cortex), whereas the conscious copy does not seem
o be sensitive to such factors, indicating a qualitative difference in
he structure of the two representations.
Below we will give an overview of the neuroscientiﬁc evidence
n the neural signature of WM retention and mental imagery.
nfortunately, there is currently a lack of neuroscientiﬁc evidence
omparing neural activity associated with WM retention and WM
ntrospection, and the few studies that have attempted this might
ave issues that complicate their interpretation, as will be dis-
ussed below.
According to sensory recruitment hypothesis,  maintained sen-
ory information is a form of “lingering” neural activity in sensory
rain areas involved in perceptual processing (D’Esposito, 2007;
asternak and Greenlee, 2005). Indeed, early visual cortex has been
hown to be involved in VSTM (van de Ven et al., 2012), and the
eactivation of modality-speciﬁc sensory brain regions has been
inked with memory retrieval (Barsalou, 2008). Recent multivariate
nalyses of neuroimaging data have further supported this view by
howing that the way in which early visual areas represent visual
nformation is very similar across VSTM and visual perception
Harrison and Tong, 2009; LaRocque et al., 2013; Lewis-Peacock
nd Postle, 2012; Serences et al., 2009).
In order to investigate the neural underpinnings of state-
ased models of WM,  Lewis-Peacock and Postle (Emrich et al.,
013; LaRocque et al., 2013; Lewis-Peacock and Postle, 2012;
ewis-Peacock et al., 2012; Riggall and Postle, 2012) performed
ultivariate analyses during the delay period of a WM task in brain
reas responsive to the currently attended as well as the currently
nattended memory item. They found no evidence for WM con-
ent being represented in frontal and parietal brain areas which
howed a load-dependent, sustained delay-period increase in brain
ctivity. In contrast, decoding from sensory brain areas responsive
o the initial visual stimulus, but not activated during the delay
eriod, did yield above chance decoding accuracies, which wereehavioral Reviews 55 (2015) 510–519
load-dependent and correlated with participants’ behavioral mem-
ory precision (Emrich et al., 2013; Riggall and Postle, 2012). This
suggests that parietal attentional mechanisms guide the read-out
of memory content from occipital visual areas.
In addition, Lewis-Peacock and Postle (2012) found increased
decoding accuracies for attended versus unattended items, which
they interpret as evidence for an active neural representation of
WM content, which is within the focus of attention (FoA). In con-
trast, the unattended WM content could not be decoded from the
BOLD signal, providing neural evidence for distinct states within
WM.  The “inactive” neural state associated with the unattended
item could be reactivated when that item re-entered the FoA. As
these studies did not assess conscious experience of the retro-cued
item, they do not directly speak to the issue of how WM content
is introspected. Speciﬁcally, it is not known whether retro-cueing
evoked not only an “attended” state but also conscious experience
of the memory item. Further studies using this paradigm, combined
with manipulations/assessment of the level of conscious experi-
ence of the retro-cued items, could be used to examine neural
representations associated with consciously experience memory
content and to test our model directly.
If VSTM content and its conscious experience in the form of
imagery rely on the same underlying representation, then one
would expect them to have similar characteristics at the neuronal
level. For example, if there is a neuronal code that is associated with
stimulus maintenance (e.g. a speciﬁc ﬁring pattern of orientation-
selective neurons when maintaining the orientation of a grating),
then that neural code should be associated also with imagery.
Indeed, neuroimaging work has shown that mental imagery and
visual perception activate overlapping areas in the early visual cor-
tices (e.g. Barsalou, 2008; Kosslyn and Thompson, 2003; Kosslyn
et al., 1995). Furthermore, overlapping neural structures for VSTM
and imagery have been identiﬁed (Slotnick et al., 2012), and a recent
study showed that the content of VSTM, imagery, and visual per-
ception can be decoded from the pattern of brain activity in early
visual areas (Albers et al., 2013).
From this, one might conclude that VSTM and imagery rely on
the same regions and even neural representations in the visual cor-
tex. As discussed in previous sections, the behavioral evidence is
inconsistent with this view, as the impact of VSTM and imagery
on external input differs. From the neural perspective, there is a
confound in the literature which may  explain this neural overlap,
as pointed out by Kaas et al. (2010). In most studies on mental
imagery, participants are instructed to imagine (a manipulated ver-
sion of) a stimulus presented at the start of each trial. The neural
correlates of imagery as observed in these studies might there-
fore reﬂect memory for the stimulus on which visual imagery is
based, i.e. the original memory trace, rather than being a neural
marker of the mental image, and thus its phenomenal experience,
per se. To overcome this confound, Kaas et al. (2010) used a motion
imagery paradigm in which participants based their mental image
on static stimuli. Kaas et al. (2010) found increased activation in
hMT+/V5, whereas critically the BOLD signal in early visual areas
was decreased during imagery (indicating that external visual input
was suppressed during mental imagery, as discussed above). In
contrast, those early visual areas show an increased BOLD sig-
nal during WM maintenance of motion information (Goebel et al.,
1998; Slotnick et al., 2005). This is consistent with our proposal
that the conscious representation involves a bound object (thus
more likely to be represented at higher extrastriate levels) whereas
memory content can be feature-speciﬁc.
Even if the same visual areas are involved in mental imagery,
VSTM and visual perception, the neural code may  still differ across
the three processes. The neural representation underlying each of
them is still under debate. With respect to VSTM, sustained neu-
ronal activity in feature-selective neurons of prefrontal areas was
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raditionally believed to represent WM content during retention
Goldman-Rakic, 1995). This hypothesis has been challenged and
arious alternatives have been suggested. Rather than the ﬁxed
electivity of single neurons, the relative activity across a neuronal
opulation could represent memory content (Jun et al., 2010). This
opulation code has been suggested to be static (i.e. the popula-
ion activity that codes for the memory stays the same throughout
he entire delay) or dynamic (i.e. the population code correspond-
ng to the memory dynamically changes over the duration of the
elay interval) (Sreenivasan et al., 2014). Alternatively, synap-
ic changes rather than metabolically inefﬁcient action potentials
ould be a way to encode WM content, and in this context pre-
ynaptic residues of calcium ions have been proposed to facilitate
eactivation of the original, encoded signal (Mongillo et al., 2008).
ll of these potential ways in which the brain could represent WM
ontent during the maintenance interval rely on empirical data
rom human and monkey prefrontal areas. Only the static popu-
ation coding concept is supported by neuroimaging data acquired
n human visual brain regions, namely by those fMRI studies that
ave applied multivariate analysis techniques as described earlier.
evertheless, as there is no empirical evidence on the matter, we
annot rule out the possibility that any of the suggested neural
echanisms play a role in visual cortices as well. Resolving the
uestion of whether and how the neural bases of VSTM content
nd mental imagery differ requires studies which compare VSTM
nd imagery in a non-confounded manner; the current evidence is
nconclusive.
0. Multiple memory states/processes versus multiple
emory representations
In various memory models, sometimes referred to as state-
ased models (Larocque et al., 2014), memory representations can
e in different states of attentional and access prioritization. For
xample, in Oberauer’s (2002) model, a subset of items can be held
n the region of direct access, and within this region, one item can
e selected for processing by the focus of attention and is con-
ciously accessible. In other words, focused attention selects the
M representation for conscious inspection and allows WM con-
ent conscious access.
According to these models, there is a single representation for
 speciﬁc WM content (i.e. the actual memory trace), which can be
ither in a conscious or unconscious state. Attention serves as the
indow granting us conscious access, in other words, placing the
emory trace in a state in which it is consciously accessed. Intro-
pection thus involves observation of current WM content, exactly
s it is held in memory. This is analogous to passively sitting in front
 window looking at what happens behind it, without altering what
s being observed.
The most fundamental difference to state-based models is that
n our model the introspection of WM content does not involve a
hange in the state of the memory trace, but rather the creation
f a new representation which co-exists together with the original
M trace. Introspection is rather like a painting of the scene that is
ccurring behind the window; it captures most of that scene, but
s not identical to it. The proposed conscious copy is not a precise
uplicate of the original working memory trace, but rather contains
ualitatively different information; namely feature-bound visual
nformation placed within a context. Cognitive processes operat-
ng on the original memory trace thus utilize different information
rom those operating on the conscious copy. The experimental evi-
ence presented in the sections above is in accordance with the
xistence of multiple memory representations. For example, the
ndings of Bona et al. (2013), Bona and Silvanto (2014) suggest
hat the conscious experience and the actual memory trace co-exist.ehavioral Reviews 55 (2015) 510–519 517
To accommodate existing state-based models, one would need to
postulate that a memory item can exist in two  states at the same
time.
Alternatively, one could consider forced-choice WM perfor-
mance and introspection as reﬂecting two distinct processes
operating on a single representation in the occipital cortex, imple-
mented by parietal attentional mechanisms. In other words, instead
of two  distinct representations, there might be two different ways
of accessing a single representation. This would be analogous to
ﬁnding a book in a library through different search methods. For
example, the books may  be organized by call number, but at the
same time the librarian may possess a list which contains infor-
mation about the content and location of each book. The critical
point about the library analogy is that, no matter through which
route one ﬁnds the book, it is unreadable if its pages are missing.
In other words, regardless of the search method, the original book
needs to be found; disruption of the original memory represen-
tation will lead to failure to access, whatever the search strategy.
What speaks against this possibility is the ﬁnding that introspec-
tive ratings can be unaffected even when the actual memory trace
is impaired (Bona et al., 2013). One could argue that the distracter
causing this effect could have interfered with the process of the
WM maintenance rather than with the actual memory trace itself.
However, we consider this explanation unlikely, as the orientation-
speciﬁc distracter effect indicates that the distracter operates on the
same perceptual channels which are also involved in initial encod-
ing (Magnussen et al., 1991), and which thus represent the visual
content.
Furthermore, there is much neuropsychological evidence indi-
cating that internally generated conscious experience (in the form
of visual imagery) relies most heavily on regions such as the infero-
temporal cortex and can even function in the absence of early visual
areas (see Bartolomeo, 2002 for review), inconsistent with the idea
of lower level occipital regions acting as the source of “read-out”
for introspection. However, the prior literature has mainly focused
on imagery based on long-term memory; whether this applies to
WM introspection remains to be directly tested.
The library analogy is interesting in that it raises the question of
what exactly is a memory representation. Let us say the librarian’s
records contain a summary of each book. Albeit perhaps incomplete
and condensed, the librarian’s list would nevertheless be a version
of the information contained in the book; thus it could be described
as a second representation, or copy, of that information. In this view,
numerous representations of the original book would exist. The
essence of our model is that such multiple representations exist in
working memory.
Finally, one may  ask whether there is need for another model
of WM function. In our view, the growing evidence for dissocia-
tion of WM and consciousness (see Soto and Silvanto, 2014, for
review) raise unavoidable questions about how consciously experi-
enced memory contents might differ from those that are not being
introspected. Furthermore, the evidence that VSTM content and
its conscious experience interact with external visual input in a
qualitatively different manner indicates that these differences are
of functional signiﬁcance. There is thus need for a model which
speciﬁcally address the subjective, introspective aspects of WM.
There is always a danger of new cognitive models being analo-
gies at best and semantics at worst, if not accompanied by testable
predictions and proposals of putative neural underpinnings. Is our
model guilty of this? We  would argue this not to be the case because
our model generates speciﬁc predictions that are different from
those derived from other theories. As stated above, the key fea-
ture of our proposal which sets it apart from prior models is the
co-existence of two  representations—the memory trace and the con-
scious copy. This leads to the prediction that both the conscious
copy and the actual memory trace should differ in their neural
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ases (for example in terms of their cortical locus or their signa-
ure of oscillatory activity), when manipulation and assessment of
onscious experience of WM content is built into the study design.
n contrast, state-based models would not predict the existence of
ultiple memory representations.
1. Conclusion
We  propose that for WM content to be introspected, a new rep-
esentation must be created for the conscious domain. The WM
epresentation and the conscious representation exist in parallel,
uch that once the “conscious copy” has been created, the two
epresentations can be independently inﬂuenced and modulated.
illful manipulation of memory content occurs via the conscious
opy and its outcome can feed back to and modulate the orig-
nal memory trace. Separate representations are needed due to
he different functional demands of conscious perception and WM
uidance of visual processing. During conscious experience, confu-
ion of internally generated and externally induced percepts must
e avoided; thus consciously experienced memory content must
ave an inhibitory relationship with other items competing for
onscious access. In contrast, nonconscious WM content acts as a
atekeeper, sometimes facilitating the encoding of incoming sen-
ory information.
cknowledgments
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